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Abstract 
Most agree that voting in presidential general elections is largely contingent on the 
evaluations of the candidates, issues, and parties. Yet in presidential primary elections 
the determinants of voter choices a.re less clear. Partisanship is inconsequential, infor­
mation a.bout candidate personalities and policy positions is scarce, and a fourth factor, 
expectations, may influence voters. In this pa.per, we reconsider the influence of political 
issues in presidential primaries. We argue that pa.st work has not adequately considered 
how "issues matter" in primary elections . Primaries are intra-party affairs, and the polit­
ical issues which typically divide the parties are not very relevant in primaries. Instead, 
we focus on the policy issues ea.ch candidate chooses to emphasize in their quest for the 
nomination, which we call policy priori ties. With data gathered about media coverage of 
the presidential contenders in the 1988 primaries, and using exit poll data from the 1988 
Super Tuesday primaries, we show that issues, as policy priorities, do matter in  pres­
idential primary elections. This research also implies that primary campaigns matter, 
since information concerning the policy priorities of the candidates reaches the intended 
audience. 
Issues and The Presidential Primary Voter 
John H. Aldrich R. Michael Alvarez 
1 Introduction 
Faced with a choice between two candidates in November of an election year, voters 
in presidential elections make their decisions based on partisan, policy, and character 
criteria. Few would disagree with that claim. But the source of lasting disagreement 
concerns the relative weight of these three factors, both within and across elections. This 
consensus is strained further when examining other electoral settings. Certainly, there 
is no consensus about which factors guide voter choice in presidential primary elections, 
let alone their relative weight. Partisanship cannot be consequential, since primaries 
are struggles within parties for nomination. More candidate specific factors - ranging 
from personality and leadership evaluations to their positions on policy issues - have 
been discounted by many who have written about primary voting. These conclusions 
have led some to be quite pessimistic about the quality of voting in American presiden­
tial primaries: primary voters appear to be poorly informed that their decisions look 
insubstantial (see, e.g., Keeter and Zukin 1983). 
Others have been more sanguine. Brady and Johnston ( 1987) showed that primary 
voters knew about the 1984 candidates and that their information was heavily influenced 
by perceptions of the relative viability of each candidate. Popkin ( 1991) granted that per­
ceptions of viability and expectations are important, yet argued that changes in perceived 
viabili ty influenced the amount of information voters possess about candidates, and how 
they frame their decisions. Bartels ( 1988) examined the role of "political predisposi­
tions" in primary election voting, and found that these predispositions, in combination 
with candidate expectations, were important determinants of voter preferences. And 
others have looked for more direct influences of political attitudes on primary election 
voting (Gopoian 1982; Norrander 1986; Wattier 1983; Williams et al. 1976). 
•An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest. Political Science
Association, Chicago, IL, April 1992. Some of the data utilized in this paper were made available by 
the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. Larry Bartels, John Brehm, David 
Canon, Paul Gronke, John Kessel, Philip Paolino, and Wayne Parent provided helpful comments. 
1 
Our concern is on the role of political issues i n  primary voting. Those who have found 
little i mpact of i ssues in primaries have missed a critical point: i mportant differences 
exist between the i nstitutions which frame the choices faced by voters i n  the spring and 
fall of an election year. Ignoring these institutional differences has led to a systematic 
underestimation of the role of policy issues i n  presidential nomination contests. Since 
primaries are contested within political parties, criteria l ike partisanship, retrospective 
evaluations, and ideological and policy distinctions between the parties matter less to 
primary voters. The implications for the role of policy issues is clear: the issues which 
traditionally divide the two major parties in the United States ( "cleavage issues") should
be largely irrelevant i n  primary election decision-making. 
If cleavage issues are irrelevant, then how can policy issues enter voter choice in  a 
presidential primary? First, consider the problem from a candidate's point of view. If the 
candidate's positions on issues cannot distinguish himself from the other candidates, what 
can? We argue that the major focus on policy issues in primary campaigns concerns policy 
priorities, not policy positions. With relatively little difference among the candidates' 
policy positions , the question the voter asks "which candidate has priorities which most 
closely match my owh ?" Our argument is presented fully in  the next section. We then 
show evidence from the 1988 Super Tuesday primaries which supports our claims. 
2 Partisan Cleavages and Policy Priorities in Pri­
mary Election Voting 
While most of the literature on primary election voting has contrasted the basis of choice 
in the spring to that in the general election, a few have noted similarities. Wattier ( 1983) 
utilized a decision-making model developed for general election contests, which performed 
quite well in primary election data. Bartels ( 1988) and Popkin ( 1991), while studying 
choice in the context of the primary campaign, both describe a decision-making process 
which is more general, and thus equally applicable to general election voting. 
There are a number of similarities between the primary and general election con­
text facing the potential voter. First, those participating in  the primary are also very 
likely to vote in the fall, and in both cases, are motivated by the same fundamental 
goal: supporting the candidate they believe will be the best president. Also, the general 
election campaign is now described as candidate-centered. The same is at least as true 
of the primary election campaign: candidates and their evaluations by the voters are 
central elements of voter choice in both election-contexts (see Campbell 1983; Wattier 
1983; Marshall 1984; Norrander 1986; Wattenberg 1990; Williams et al 1976). Lastly, 
both campaigns occur in a rich media environment. Thus there is a continuing flood 
of structured political i nformation about the candidates (Aldrich 1980; Patterson 1980; 
Robinson and Sheehan 1983; Brady and Johnston 1987; Bartels 1988). 
Yet the decision-making task in these two election contexts has i mportant differences. 
First, primary contests occur within parties, and thus voter choices rarely hinge on the 
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typical elements of general election decision-making, such as party identification, policy 
and ideological cleavages between the parties , and retrospective evaluations. Second, the 
choice context in the primary election is often complex, since typically there are a number 
of candidates to choose among, and since these candidates often have not penetrated into 
the electoral consciousness. Third, the primary campaign is dynamic, being composed 
of many campaigns, in different states, at different times, with candidates entering the 
race and withdrawing, some gathering momentum and some never gaining substantial 
support. 
The implication of these comparisons profoundly affect the study primary election 
voting. The decision-making process and goals of voters are quite similar in both election 
contexts. However, institutional differences require careful consideration of how specific 
components of the voter's decision, such as policy preferences, might differ. We take for 
granted - and show later - that policy preferences "matter" in  primary contexts, just 
as they do in general election contexts. Yet we believe they take different forms in the 
different institutional contexts, which, if not taken into account, will lead to incorrect 
assessments of their affects on choice. 
Most of the important and persistent policy debates in American politics are reflected 
in cleavages between the parties, especially at the elite level (e.g . ,  Page 1978; Sundquist 
1983) .  Cleavages between the parties on many policy issues have increased dramatically 
in recent years. The degree of party voting in Congress, for example, has risen sharply 
over the last twenty years (Poole and Rosenthal 1991; Rohde 1991 ) .  Furthermore, the 
substantial differences between convention delegates of the two parties has grown, as 
Democrats became increasingly liberal after 1972, and as Republicans became sharply 
more conservative in the Reagan-Bush years (Bruce, Clark, and Kessel 1992) .  Addi­
tional evidence indicates that this increased polarization may be reflected as well at the 
mass level, as the public now consistently perceives large differences between the parties, 
and their presidential candidates, on most policy issues (Abramson, Aldrich ,  and Rohde 
1983, 1987, 1990) .  Perhaps as a result of the importance and permanence of these issue 
cleavages, most of the issue placement questions asked by the National Election Studies 
and other academic surveys concern policy domains reflecting these cleavages. 
However, primaries are intra-party affairs. Noting this fact, many have concluded that 
policy issues do not matter in presidential primaries, since these within-party contests 
usually produce little differentiation among the candidates on the major policy cleavages 
which divide the parties . Sometimes, of course, intra-party differences on cleavage issues 
are important in primary elections. The Vietnam War in 1968 was certainly a case in 
point, since McCarthy and Kennedy differed sharply from Johnson and Humphrey over 
American involvement in the conflict. But the intrusion of such major cleavage issues in 
primary contests is rare. 
With little differentiation among the candidates on these cleavage issues, voters nec­
essarily find it impossible in most cases to distinguish among the candidate's stands on 
these issues. Combined with the sheer numbers of candidates in most primary races, 
little intra-party differentiation leads to relatively low levels of voter knowledg� of candi-
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date positions and to little choice based on issue position. But, intra-party similarity on 
cleavage issues does not imply that issues do not "matter" in  primary elections. Abram­
son, Aldrich ,  and Rohde ( 1987) utilized Gallup data from the 1984 primary race and 
found that Mondale was perceived to be the more effective candidate for dealing with 
traditional New Deal concerns like welfare, unemployment, and poverty, but that Hart 
was perceived to be better at handling "new issues" problems, like economic competi­
tiveness and environmental issues. Mondale and Hart may have differed little in where 
they stood on these issues , but the themes of their campaign were reflected in how the 
primary electorate perceived where each might be most effective. 
In the 1988 primaries, the candidates within each party were relatively similar. In 
Table 1 we give the average ideological positions of the candidates within each party as 
estimated from the 1988 NES Super Tuesday Study. The important point in this table 
is that the candidates in each party cluster quite closely together; while across parties 
the candidates are relatively distinct. Among the Democratic candidates, Jackson and 
Hart and the outliers on the left, while Gore is the outlier on the right. But there is 
only approximately one point on the seven-point ideological scale which separates these 
outlying candidates - hardly enough difference to be relevant for most primary voters. 
The Republicans are even more homogenous, with less than one point on the seven-point 
scale separating their ideological outliers (Dupont and Robertson) . 1 
Thus, primary candidates within the same party may not differ in their positions 
on cleavage issues , but often differ on the priorities they place on various problems. 
Typically, the policy-related aspects of campaigns are assertions about the problems 
candidates see as most important and to which they promise to devote their energies if 
elected. In the 1988 Republican primaries, for example, budget deficits became "Dole's 
issue" not because he was the only Republican against large deficits, but because his 
campaign statements and his past reputation made him the most likely Republican to 
act decisively to reduce the deficit. 
There is no doubt that this is a policy campaign ,  but is not a policy campaign at­
tempting to persuade the primary electorate that the candidate has positions similar to 
theirs on policy issues. Rather, it is a policy campaign devoted to convincing voters that 
the candidate has concerns similar to their's, and that the candidate will be the person 
most likely to commit the resources needed to solve those problems .  
Two examples from early in the 1988 election season illustrate our claims. In  New 
Hampshire, after Dole had won the Iowa caucuses and was shown to have five-percentage 
point lead over Bush in private tracking pools, the Bush campaign unleashed the first of 
1 We examined the ideological homogeneity within and across the candidates of each party in the 
primary elections since 1976 and have found that, as a rule, there is substantial homogeneity within each 
party, and considerable heterogeneity across the two parties. Also, our examination of voter awareness 
of candidate policy positions on major cleavage issues shows that typically a third of respondents, who 
have already said they have heard of a particular candidate, cannot place the candidate on positional 
issues. These data are available from the authors upon request. 
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a series of memorable television advertisements - the "straddle" ad:2 
P ictures of Bush and Dole. Announcer: "George Bush and Bob Dole on lead­
ership." 
Cut to: Portrait of Bush, with heading "Led Fight for INF." Announcer: 
"George Bush led the fight on the INF treaty for Ronald Reagan." 
Cut to: Two Dole portraits facing each other with heading 
"Straddled."  Announcer: "Bob Dole straddled, until Iowans pushed him into 
supporting INF." 
Cut to: Bush portrait, with heading "Against Oil Import Fee."  Announcer: 
"George Bush is against an oil import tax." 
Cut to: Dole pictures, with heading "Straddled." Announcer: "Bob Dole strad­
dled, but now says he's for an oil import fee." 
Cut to: Bush portrait, with heading "Won't Raise Taxes" ;  a period is shortly 
placed emphatically after "Taxes. "  Announcer: "George Bush says he won't 
raise taxes, period." 
Cut to: Dole pictures, with heading "Straddled."  The heading dissolves into 
"Taxes - He can 't say no." Announcer: "Bob Dole straddles, and he just won't 
promise not to raise taxes. And you know what that means." 
Cut to: Bush picture, with a flag and header "Bush - Presidential Leader­
ship. " Announcer: "George Bush - ready on Day One to provide presidential 
leadership." 
This ad emphasized that Dole only ruled out tax decreases , not that he was necessarily 
in favor of raising taxes. The point of the ad was not the positions of the candidates on 
taxes (but, of course, if it persuaded some voters that Dole would increase taxes, so much 
the better ) . The point was to show that Bush was strongly resolved to keep taxes from 
increasing, period, while Dole might eventually increase taxes, perhaps to help alleviate 
the deficit. Thus, voters primarily concerned about tax increases would be attracted to 
Bush , while those concerned about the deficit would be attracted to Dole. The question 
here was who had which priorities, and many credit this ad with producing a nine-point 
victory for Bush in the anti-taxation state of New Hampshire. 
The other example comes from the Democratic race. In late January, with polls 
producing volatile results, the Gephardt campaign moved to emphasize "the trade issue:" 
Picture: Auto workers construct cars on an assembly line. Gephardt: "They 
work their hearts out every day, trying to turn out a good product at a decent 
price. Then the Korean government slaps on nine separate taxes and tariffs 
2Both these transcripts are reprinted from Maloney 1989. 
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and when that government is done, a $10,000 Chrysler K car costs $48,000 in
Korea." 
Cut to: Gephardt talking with and listening to auto workers. Gephardt: "It's 
not their fault we can't sell our cars in a market like that, and I'm tired of 
hearing American workers blamed for it." 
Cut to: Gephardt speaking in  front of an industrial setting. Gephardt: "I've 
been criticized for my trade policy, for saying it's time to open up markets, to 
push down trade barriers like those Korean taxes and tariffs." Header appears 
on screen: "Dick Gephardt." Geph ardt: "The Gephardt Amendment calls for 
six months of negotiation. If that doesn't work, and I'm President, and we have 
to walk away from the table, the Koreans will know two things: They'll know 
we'll still honor our treaties to defend them, because that's the kind of country 
we are. But they 'II also be left asking themselves how many Americans are 
going to pay $4 8, 000 for one of their Hyndais."
Cut to: Slogans for Gephardt. 
Here Gephardt is making trade policy "his issue." There is little mention of where he 
stands on specifics of trade policy, except that he will work to reduce overseas barriers 
facing American products . And apparently this advertisement worked in Iowa, since it 
is widely credited with having swung the victory to Gephardt. 
Candidates conduct policy campaigns in two ways - issue emphasis and issue posi­
tions (Page 1 978) . Voters can use this information to answer two questions .  First, what 
will the candidate focus his scarce resources on once in office? Second ,  what would the 
candidate do with these resources to solve that problem? Both sides of this question are 
necessary, but neither are alone sufficient. A candidate who agrees with the voter on 
the appropriate solution but does not desire to act on the problem is no better than a 
candidate who shares the concern but promises to take the i ncorrect action. In primary 
elections, in which there is little disagreement about what position to take, the question 
becomes, almost exclusively, which pressing problems will receive highest priority. 
On some issues concern about the problem alone can be sufficient, since there is 
consensus on the outcome. Emphasizing unemployment, for example, means to citizens 
that the candidate is committed to reducing unemployment, not to increasing it. In 
such cases, the important point is the candidate's priority, not stance. And when there 
are persistent and clear cleavages between the parties , priorities of the candidates of a 
homogeneous party are the meaningful basis of choosing among them. 
Moreover, emphasis and other indicators of a candidate's priorities suggest a great 
deal about the candidate. A candidate's priorities provide important cues for voters 
assessing the personal and professional characteristics of the candidate. The candidate 
who identifies the same problems facing the nation as the voter sees as most in need of 
attention is likely to be seen by the voter as the candidate best suited to represent the 
voter and to act in office in a manner the voter sees appropriate (e.g., Popki1' 1991 ) .  
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Therefore, in  general election contests where two candidates differ along persistent 
partisan cleavages, differences in stances on the these issues may be the most important 
distinguishing characteristics between the candidates, and thus for voter choice between 
them. But in multi-candidate, intra-party contests with small differentiation in issue 
positions, these are insufficient criteria. Furthermore if evaluations of the candidates in 
the primary or general election are based on the belief that presidents should identify 
pressing problems and act to resolve them, then priorities are the appropriate criteria. 
There is evidence, even from general elections, to support these assertions. RePass ( 1971 ) , 
for one, showed that responses to the "most important issues" question are strongly 
related to voter choice, and more recently, Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida ( 1989) have 
used similar data to argue that when voter concerns are emphasized in  the campaign, 
those concerns become more accessible to the voter in their decision-making (see also 
Abramson, Aldrich and Rhode 1983, 1987, 1991 ) .3 
3 Policy Priorities in the 1988 Super Tuesday Pri-
• mar1es 
We first need to understand the priorities of the candidates in the 1988 primaries. There 
are no avai lable survey data which ask respondents to indicate their perceptions candidate 
priorities in the 1988 primary races. We can, however, examine candidates' strategies, 
and in particular what issues candidates mentioned on the campaign trail leading up to 
the Super Tuesday primary, as reported in the published news media. 
To collect these data, we turn to the NewsBank collection of regional and local news­
papers , the New York Times index, and the chronological index in the Almanac of 1988 
Presidential Politics. Campaign stories included in our sample fit three criteria: they 
concerned specific candidate; discussed at least one policy issue; and were published 
between January 1987 and March 1988. This meant, for instance, that general stories 
about policy issues in the Democratic campaign, or stories about campaign events are 
not examined. A total of 610  stories met these criteria and were coded for the major 
issue content and the candidate involved. Broad coding guidelines for 3 1  issue categories 
were established, covering the 14 candidates in the primary race. 4 
3Policy priorities should not be confused with valence issues (Stokes 1963). The latter are issues that 
typically are heavily laden with symbolic or emotional content. Candidates might choose to devote their 
issue emphases to valence issues, and voters who agree with such priorities should be more likely to 
support such candidates. But priorities can also be about substantive policy matters - education, job 
creation, or defense policy. Thus, policy priorities are not limited to valence issues. 
4The fourteen candidates are Biden, Gephardt, Gore, Hart, Jackson, Simon, Babbitt, Dukakis, Haig, 
Kemp, Dupont, Robertson, Dole, and Bush. The issue mention categories are SDI, education, AIDS, 
foreign economic competition, national health care, national defense and security, plant closings, Middle 
East, MIA's in South-East Asia, children's health, welfare, crime drugs, fiscal policy and the deficit, trade 
policy, Iran-contra, tobacco subsidies, California oil exploration, abortion, jobs and unemployment, oil 
import taxes and fees, social security, environment, civil rights, Central America, school prayer, human 
rights, worker's bill of rights, homelessness and housing, and women's pay equity. All stories in the 
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To illustrate, we present these data on the four candidates in each party who generated 
at least 5% of the primary vote in  more than one Super Tuesday state (Dukakis, Gephardt, 
Gore, and Jackson; Bush, Dole, Kemp, and Robertson). Furthermore, we aggregate the 
31 issue categories into a smaller set: unemployment, trade policy, national defense, 
poverty, Central America, the deficit, social security, and, for Republicans, moral values. 
To determine the focuses of the debates within each party, we present in  Table 2 the issue 
priorities for the four Democrats; similar information is given for the four Republican 
candidates in Table 3. 
Differences in the policy campaigns of the two parties are clearly seen in both tables. 
The debate within the Democratic party focused largely on two concerns - economic 
and foreign policy issues . Unemployment and trade policy, in particular, dominated 
the Democratic policy campaigns, with national defense and poverty next in emphasis. 
Central America, the budget deficit, and social security did not loom especially large in 
the Democratic race. 
The Republican candidates focused heavily on foreign policy, and somewhat on eco­
nomic matters . Central America dominated the foreign policy discussion among Re­
publicans, with much of i t  focused on Bush's involvement in  the Iran-Contra scandal 
specifically, and on Contra aid and Nicaragua more generally. However, there are many 
mentions of national defense matters, especially arms control . The budget deficit, which 
we discussed above in reference to Dole, was mentioned often by the Republicans ,  as were 
references to moral values, but the rest of the categories all fell below 10% .  
Even more dramatic are differences i n  the issue priorities of the various candidates. 
Among Democrats, Dukakis focused primarily on unemployment and job creation, fol­
lowed by trade policy. Gephardt, as noted above, focused heavily on trade policy and on 
unemployment and jobs , to a lesser extent. Gore focused almost his entire policy cam­
paign in this period on defense issues, mainly arms control , while Jackson emphasized 
jobs, unemployment , and poverty as his priorities during the campaign. 
Differences among the Republican candidates ' policy campaigns are also apparent. 
Bush spent a lot of effort refuting charges of his personal knowledge and involvement 
three sources relating to campaign issues in the 1988 primary race (January 1987 to March 1988) were 
examined. Those stories referring specifically to a candidate and an issue were coded. If multiple issues 
are mentioned, we first ascertain the theme of the article, and if unsuccessful, we code the first issue 
mentioned. A total of 473 stories were culled from the NewsBank microfiche files, 7 1  from the New 
York Times, and 66 from the Almanac of 1988 Presidential Politics. The issue mentions are aggregated
into these categories to facilitate interpretation and to mesh with the exit poll data. The specific 
issue priorities discussed above are aggregated: unemployment - mentions of plant closings, jobs and 
unemployment, and worker's bill of rights; trade policy- mentions of foreign economic competition, trade -
policy, and oil tariffs; national defense - SDI, national defense and security, Middle East, MIA's; poverty 
- mentions of children's health, welfare, crime, civil rights, homelessness; Central America - mentions 
of Iran-Contra, Central America; Deficit - mentions of the deficit and fiscal policy; social security -
mentions of national health care and social security; and moral values - AIDS, drugs, abortion, and 
school prayer. All other categories of issues and candidates are dropped from this analysis, leaving a 
sample of 383 stories. 
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in the Iran-Contra affair; however, he did turn attention to taxes, the budget deficit ,  
and general defense matters. Dole also spent a lot of his policy campaign discussing 
Central America, but he focused on Contra aid almost as much as he mentioned the 
Iran- Contra affair. Dole also mentioned other foreign policy matters relating to national 
defense (mainly arms control) ,  but he spent almost as much time discussing the budget 
deficit and poverty. Kemp mentioned mainly the budget deficit and national defense, but 
devoted some of his campaign emphasis to social security. Robertson primarily discussed 
national defense, especially arms control, and moral values. 
The important question is to what extent these candidate emphases are reflected in 
voter choices among these candidates in the 1988 Super Tuesday primaries. To examine 
this question, we turn to data drawn from the CBS News New York Times 1988 Super 
Tuesday Primary Election Exit Polls. These data are well-suited for testing our argument 
regarding policy priorities. Two distinct sets of exit polls were conducted. We use surveys 
given to Democratic (total cases 9176) and Republican (total cases 7598) voters in a 
southern exit poll on March 8, 1988 (Super Tuesday) .5 
Five sets of independent variables are available from these exit polls, and are coded 
in  the following manner: 
A .  Demographic Variables: 
Minority Status: coded 1 for minorities, zero otherwise (Democratic model); 
Born-Again Christians: coded 1 for fundamentalist Christians (Republican 
model); 
Gender: coded 1 for females and 0 for males; 
Union Membership: coded 1 for union members and 0 otherwise; 
Income: taken directly from the exit poll where 1 corresponded to a reported 
income of less than $12,000, 2 of $12,500 to $24,999, 3 of $25,000 to $34,999, 4 
of $35,000 to $50,000, and 5 of greater than $50,000. 
B.  Issue Priorities: 
A set of dummy variables, coded 1 i f  the respondent mentioned the issue as 
being important in their decision, and 0 otherwise. From the Democratic poll ,  
variables for unemployment, trade, deficit, social security, poor, and defense 
are employed; from the Republican poll, variables for the Intermediate-Range 
5The N ES data from 1988 do not allow us to test our arguments adequately, since there is no readily­
available information regarding priorities of either the candidates or the voters. Additionally, these 
exit polls are much richer in both respondents and useful control variables than the Gallup polls. The 
southern regional exit poll was conducted in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Another set of exit 
polls was gathered in each of the states holding primaries on March 8, 1992. We used the regional exit 
polls instead of the state-level polls to reduce the complexity of the analysis and discussion. 
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Missile Treaty, trade, deficit, Nicaragua, social security, taxes, and moral issues, 
are utilized;6 
C. Candidate Evaluations: 
For each of the candidates in the analysis, a variable coded 1 if the respondent 
reported a favorable opinion of the candidate, and 0 otherwise; 
D. Reagan Approval: 
coded so that 1 indicated Reagan approval and 0 indicated disapproval; 
E .  Viability and Expectations: 
coded 1 if a respondent reported that whether the candidate could wm m 
November was important, and 0 otherwise. 
The dependent variable in each set of data was which candidate the respondent re­
ported voting for. On the Democratic side, the candidates we include in the model are 
Dukakis, Gephardt, Gore, and Jackson, and on the Republican, they are Bush, Dole, 
Kemp, and Robertson . The model we estimate for each set of exit poll data is :  
Prob(}i = j)/Prob(}i = k) = 
O'j + f31j( Demographics )i + (32j( Priorities )i 
+ (33j{ Evaluations )i + (34j( Approval)i
+f3sj( Expectations )i + €ij 
where i represents the voter, j and k represent candidates, and €ij an independently 
distributed stochastic term.7 We use unordered logit to estimate this equation for Demo­
cratic and Republican Super Tuesday voters, since it is ideally suited for models with 
6In the Democratic data, a dummy variable for Nicaragua as a priority was not included in the results 
reported here. Less than 10% of the exit poll respondents reported this as a concern. Excluding this 
dummy variables in no way changes the results. 
7This specification was selected to insure that we obtain the most conservative estimates of the effects 
of policy priorities as possible. Two sets of the variables in this model might be problematic for the 
specification: the demographic control variables and the candidate evaluation indicators. Both vectors 
of variables are necessary to control for systematic factors which are likely to be present in the error 
terms of the unordered logit models. The demographic variables we include to understand the demo­
graphic profiles of support received by each candidate, and are important factors in our interpretation 
of the unordered logit models below (a similar set of variables are in Bartels' ( 1988) index of political 
predispositions). The candidate evaluation indicators are crude controls for the many dimensions of 
candidate trait evaluations. Their use raises the possibility of endogeneity, which is difficult to model in 
the unordered logit specification. We estimated our models without the vector of candidate evaluation 
terms, and their exclusion in general only reduces the magnitude of the variances of the estimates, which 
accordingly increases the statistical significance of most. of the estimates - especially those of the policy 
priority variables (these estimates are available upon request). Thus the inclusion of these candidate 
evaluation terms, and the possible statistical problems raised by including them in this specification, 
only make for a more conservative test of our argument. 
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categorical dependent variables, such as our measure of candidate choice. For a depen­
dent variable with K categories, K-1 equations are estimated, and the coefficients are 
interpreted as the difference that a particular independent variable has on the proba­
bility of supporting a particular candidate, relative to the baseline (or Kth, excluded) 
candidate. 8 T he estimates of the unordered logit models for Democratic primary voters 
are in  Table 4. 
The columns in Table 4 give the maximum-likelihood estimates, followed by the stan­
dard error in parentheses, and stars for various levels of statistical significance. The 
first column is the equation for the likelihood that a voter would choose Gephardt over 
Dukakis, the second gives a similar comparison for Gore and Dukakis, and the third col­
umn presents the comparison for Jackson and Dukakis. First, note that these models fit 
the exit poll data extremely well. Comparing the log-likelihood for the model to the log­
likelihood from a naive model (intercepts only) shows that this model improves upon the 
naive model dramatically (x2 = 9454.0, which is significant at greater than p=.01 ) ; also,
the model accurately classifies almost 7 4 % of the choices made by the 6000 respondents 
in the sample. 9 
The estimates of most interest in Table 4 concern the issue priorities, and we focus on 
them. Recall that Dukakis emphasized unemployment and trade policy, that Gephardt 
mentioned trade policy and unemployment , that Gore discussed primarily defense issues, 
and that Jackson emphasized unemployment and trade. The estimates in Table 4 sup­
port our argument concerning the impact of issue priorities in primary election voting, 
especially the sign and statistical significance of each priority indicator variable. Dukakis 
emphasized unemployment and trade: we see in the results that voters who saw unem­
ployment as a problem are less likely to support Gephardt or Gore relative to Dukakis , 
but more likely to support Jackson relative to Dukakis, yet none of these effects reaches 
significance. Gephardt discussed mainly trade, and in the first column it is apparent 
that voters who shared this priority are much more likely to support him over Dukakis. 
8In the models we report here, the baseline candidates are Dukakis in the Democratic model, and 
Bush in the Republican model. Other possible combinations of candidate comparisons could have been 
examined. However, this specification is particularly interesting since it mirrors the evaluation process 
many primary voters may have followed. By the time of the Super Tuesday primaries, both Bush and 
Dukakis had considerable momentum, and were certainly covered widely by the press. Thus, voters not 
predisposed to support either of these candidates were probably looking for an acceptable alternative, as 
were many Democratic voters in the 1984 primaries (Bartels 1988). In any case, the choice of baseline
for comparison does not affect the results. The use of unordered logit models requires an assumption 
about the choice process we are modeling. This assumption of "independence of irrelevant alternatives," 
states that the stochastic term in each individual choice equation is independent from stochastic terms 
in all other choice equations in that set of alternatives. A standard approach to determine whether 
this assumption is met requires testing the stability of the logit estimates after changing the availability 
of alternatives in the choice set (Maddala 1983). Following McFadden (1976) we re-estimated our
unordered logit models after deleting each of the choice alternatives respectively. We then compared the 
identified coefficients from the full model to those of the restricted choice set - in no instance did the 
coefficients vary by more than one standard error. This test indicates that our model is robust to this 
assumption. The unordered logit models are estimated using SST, version 2 (Dubin and Rivers 1991). 
9In the Democratic primary voter sample, 1680 respondents reported voting for Dukakis (28%), 843 
respondents for Gephardt (14. 1%), 1640 for Gore (27.3%), and 1837 for Jackson (30.6%). 
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While voters who saw defense as an important problem are more l ikely to support Gore, 
this effect was not significant . ·  And for Jackson, his discussion of jobs and unemployment 
slightly increased the l ikelihood that voters who shared those concerns would support 
him, his message about trade policy, however, was not very productive. Interestingly, 
voters concerned about social security and trade are more likely to support Gore instead 
of Dukakis. Also, voters concerned about the budget deficit and social security are more 
likely to support Dukakis relative to Jackson, but those seeing poverty as a priority are 
strongly supportive of Jackson relative to Dukakis. 
We took two additional steps to analyze the importance of the issue priority variables 
in this model. First, we are interested in the total contribution of the issue priority 
variables in the unordered logit model. To document these effects, we utilize x2 tests,
which are reported in Table 5. Here it is apparent that all of the issue priority variables 
jointly made a strong contribution to the model (x2 = 627.62) .  Additionally, four of the
six priorities contributed significantly to the model - the deficit, poverty, trade, and 
social security. Substantively these results are fascinating, since only two of the four 
priorities with substantial joint effects in the Democratic model received heavy emphasis 
by the candidates; trade and poverty, which were mentioned mainly by Gephardt and 
Jackson, respectively. Defense and unemployment, which formed the basis of the policy 
campaigns of Gore (defense), Jackson (unemployment) ,  and to some extent Dukakis 
(unemployment) ,  contribute little to the estimated support (refer to Table 4) . But the 
issue priority variables clearly contributes to the overall performance of the model.1° 
To better understand the magnitude of the effect of each issue priority for the various 
candidates, we estimate the change in the likelihood of relative candidate support which 
would occur if a voter has a certain issue priority, for three hypothetical Democratic 
primary voters . These voter "profiles" are: Voter A - black, male, union member, lower 
income, who disapproves of Reagan's performance, and who did not think that winning in  
November was important in the primary; Voter B - white, male, non-union, high income, 
approves of Reagan's performance, and who did not think that winning in November was 
important; and Voter C - white, female, non-union, moderate income, disapproves of 
Reagan's performance, and who thought winning in the fall was important. We focus 
on these three hypothetical Democratic primary voters since they represent reasonable 
combinations of demographic and attitudinal characteristics in this election. They also 
cover a range of possible types of voters in the Democratic primary, and we are interested 
in ascertaining the extent to which issue priorities may have different effects over this 
range of voter. 11 
10The test computes the difference in -2 times the log-likelihood .of a "constrained" model, estimated 
without issue priority variables, and the -2 times the log-likelihood of the "unconstrained" model. This 
test is useful for comparing two nested models, but with large samples the asymptotic theory underlying 
the test breaks down. This implies that as the sample size increases, significant joint effects are more 
likely to be found (see Aldrich and Nelson 1984; Maddala 1983; and McCullagh and Nelder 1991). 
11 Also, none of these hypothetical voters are assumed to have favorable evaluations of the candidates.
Estimating the relative likelihoods of candidate support, once the independent variables have been fixed 
at these values for each hypothetical voter, was straightforward. Given these values for a particular voter 
profile, we estimated the probability of supporting on candidate relative to Dukakis under the assumption 
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The results of these calculations are in Table 6. The upper panel gives the calculations 
for each voter profile for the probability of Gephardt relative to Dukakis support, the 
middle panel gives similar calculations for Gore over Dukakis, and the bottom panel gives 
the results for supporting Jackson compared to Dukakis. The first column for each voter 
type gives the estimated probabilities of relative support, and the second column gives 
the difference in probabilities. 
In the top panel, it is clear that if any of these hypothetical voters mentioned trade 
as their priority, they are much more likely to support Gephardt over Dukakis - ap­
proximately 20% more likely for each voter. Voters concerned about unemployment, the 
deficit ,  or national defense, are slightly more likely to prefer Dukakis to Gephardt. In 
the middle panel , we see that voters concerned with trade policy and social security are 
approximately 8% (trade) or 6% (social security) more likely to support Gore. In the 
bottom panel are even stronger results. Notice that the two hypothetical white voters (B 
and C) are much more likely to support Jackson over Dukakis if they believe poverty was 
an important problem. Indeed , Voter B becomes 23% more likely to support Jackson by 
believing. in the importance of this problem, and changes from a 1 in  4 to a 1 in 2 chance 
in supporting Jackson. Also, note that if a voter is concerned about trade policy, the 
defici t ,  or social security, they are more likely to support Dukakis over Jackson. 
Next, the unordered logit results for Republican voters are in Table 7. The table 
is organized with the first column presenting the equation for the likelihood of Dole 
support ,  the second of Kemp support , and the third of Robertson support ,  each relative 
to supporting Bush.12 This model also fits the data exceptionally well. The x2 for the
comparison of the log of the likelihoods of the model here to a naive model is highly 
significant (9172.6, significant at p=.01 ) ,  and the model predicts 76% of the choices by 
the 5735 respondents. 
Before turning to the issue results, recall the priorities of the Republican candidates as 
reflected in their policy campaigns. Bush and Dole discussed mainly Central America and 
fiscal policy, while Kemp mentioned defense, fiscal policy and social security. Robertson 
mentioned primarily defense issues, and also discussed moral values. 
In Table 7 the Republican primary voters who are concerned about the budget deficit 
are more likely to support Dole relative to Bush, and this effect was highly significant. 
that they mentioned no issue priorities as important. This is accomplished by merely substituting the 
values of each independent variable into the model, computing a logit value, and then undertaking 
the appropriate transformation for the logit model (Aldrich and Nelson 1984). Then, the values are 
recalculated, assuming that the voter gave one of the issue priorities in their survey response. Last, 
the difference between the probability of relative candidate support if no priorities are mentioned by the 
voter and the probability of relative candidate support if a particular priority are mentioned by the voter 
is calculated. These calculations allow for the possibility that the voter believes only one of the priorities 
to be important. In fact, the survey format allowed them to check up to two issues as important in 
their decisions. We also computed these probabilities for all combinations of two priorities, and they are 
available from us upon request. 
12In the Republican voter sample, 3068 respondents reported voting for Bush (53.5%), 1522 for Dole 
(26.5%), 348 for Kemp (6. 1%), and 797 for Robertson ( 13.9%). 
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Also such voters are slightly more likely to support Kemp relative to Bush. Those con­
cerned about increasing taxes, though, are more likely to support Bush relative to Dole 
and Robertson, but more likely to support Kemp relative to Bush, and this effect is 
significant in  each equation. Those mentioning social security as a priority are consis­
tently more l ikely to support Bush, but this effect was significant only in the Robertson 
model (but nearly so in the Kemp model) .  Trade policy strongly i ncreased the likelihood 
of Dole support, and marginally increased the· likelihood of Kemp support, relative to 
Bush; arms control had insignificant increases in the likelihood of Bush support relative 
to Kemp and Robertson. Interestingly, those concerned about American involvement 
in  Nicaragua are only marginally more likely to support Bush relative to Dole, but less 
likely to support Bush relative to the other two candidates. 
The joint effects of the issue priority variables in the unordered logit model are pre­
sented in  Table 8. Notice first that the joint contribution of all the priority variables 
in this model is highly significant (x2 = 326. 76) .  Additionally, four of the seven issue
priority variables have a significant joint impact - the deficit, moral values, taxes, and 
trade. Even though these four issues are overshadowed by discussion of Central America 
(especially Bush's relationship to Iran-Contra) and defense policy, these priorities are 
discussed by many of the Republican candidates, and they have a substantial influence 
on voter choice substantially (see Table 7) . 
To show the magnitude of these influences, we again calculate the estimated probabil­
ities of relative candidate support for three hypothetical voter profiles. These voters are 
defined as: Voter A - white, male, fundamentalist Christian, low income, disapproves of 
Reagan's performance, and does not believe the ability to win in November is important; 
Voter B - white, male, not fundamentalist, high income, approves of Reagan's handling 
of the job, and does not thing the ability to win in November is crit ical; Voter C - white, 
female, not fundamentalist, moderate income, disapproves of Reagan's performance, and 
thinks the ability of a candidate to win in November is very important . 
Table 9 gives the calculated probabilities for these three hypothetical voters: the 
upper panel gives the estimated probabilities of Dole relative to Bush support, the middle 
panel for Kemp relative to Bush support, and the bottom panel for Robertson relative 
to Bush support. In the upper panel, it is apparent that if these hypothetical voters 
believe that trade policy or the budget deficit is an important policy priority, they are 
approximately 10% more likely to support Dole over Bush. However, if they believe taxes 
to be important, they are about 8% more likely to support Bush. In the middle panel, 
it is clear that voters who think moral values are an important issue, and who think the 
deficit, raising taxes, and trade policy are important, are more likely to support Kemp 
over Bush . 
In the bottom panel, we show the extent to which arms control, social security, and 
raising taxes as voter priorities increase the likelihood of Bush support relative to Robert­
son support. If Voter A believes raising taxes is important, he is 1 7% more likely to 
support Bush relative to Robertson; while he is 8% more likely to support Bush if social 
security is an important priority to him, and 7% more likely to support Bush if arms 
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control is  an important issue. For Robertson, like Kemp, the strong influence of moral 
values as an issue is also clear. 
To summarize the results presented in this section, we highlight three points. First , the 
unordered logit models demonstrate that voter choice in presidential primaries is quite 
understandable. For these choices are consistent with voter attitudes and backgrounds, 
their evaluations of the candidates, and their issue priorities - and are highly predictable. 
Second ,  the models also document the extent to which issues "matter" in the primary 
election context ,  in  the form of issue priorities. The issue priority i ndicators employed in 
this analysis have strong and systematic impacts in  each of the models. Last, after our 
analysis of the issue emphases of the primary candidates, we see that the issue priorities 
of voters are reflected in their candidate choices. 
4 Discussion 
With data from the candidates' policy campaigns, and voters' choices as reported i n  exit 
polls, we show that voters reach their decisions in  the primary election i n  quite sensible, 
and predictable, ways. Political issues, as priorities, do matter in primary elections, as 
shown in our empirical results. Controlling for a wide variety of factors, voters are more 
likely to support the candidate who shares their concerns about the important problems 
facing the nation, and to shun candidates who are emphasizing other concerns in their 
campaigns. 
This is a new finding in the literature on primary voting. Other research on the effects 
of political issues in primary elections has conceptualized their i nfluence in  different ways, 
and has reached different answers. Policy positions are not very relevant in the primary 
election - and issues in that guise do not have much effect. But policy priorities are, 
we believe, a level of voter sophistication above simple reflections of a voters "political 
predispositions" toward a candidate (Bartels 1988). The empirical evidence presented 
above shows that voters are able, when candidates are discussing their own priorities, to 
choose candidates who share their concerns. 
And this implies that the campaigns conducted by the candidates also must "mat­
ter." The policy-related aspects of the 1988 primary campaigns, as reflected in the mass 
media, revealed consistent patterns in the priorities of most of the candidates. Thus, it 
does appear that candidates on the primary campaign circuit during the spring are de­
liberately discussing their policy priorities, emphasizing them time and again in speeches 
and advertisements, in an attempt to differentiate their candidacy from those of their 
opponents. And since voters clearly choose candidates with priorities that match their 
own, this information must be reaching the primary electorates. So, we believe that our 
results lend considerable support to the growing recognition that presidential election 
campaigns "matter" in the sense that they provide information upon which voters can 
make reasonable decisions (Popkin 1991 ) .  
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But our results also demonstrate that this linkage is not always perfect .  That is, there 
are issues which candidates prioritize which do not matter in  voter decision making. Take 
one prominent example. In our issue mention data, A l  Gore prioritized primarily defense 
issues (72. 7% of all mentions) .  But in  our model of Gore relative to Dukakis voting, 
the defense issue had a statistically insignificant ( though correctly signed) impact. And 
even though Gore said little about trade or social security, both of these priorities had 
a statistically significant contribution to Gore support relative to Dukakis. This implies 
that either Gore's heavy emphasis on defense did not get through to Democratic Super 
Tuesday voters, or that those who supported Gore were doing so because of the inferences 
they made about the priorities he might place on trade and social security, relative to 
Dukakis. 
Our argument, about the importance of candidate issue priorities in primary elections, 
also applies to the later portions of the primary season and the general election. In other 
words, we believe that issue priorities will matter even in a simplified decision making 
setting, where there are only two or three viable candidates. In such cases, when policy 
distance and salience are separable, the salience the candidates and voters attach to the 
policy issues will be important (Shapiro 1969; Rabinowitz et al . 1982; RePass 1971 ) .  
Yet ,  priorities should become increasingly more important as the policy differentiation 
between candidates declines. So even in a two-candidate race, issue priorities will matter 
and issue positions will not , if the candidates take similar positions but present dissimilar 
priorities. 
Additionally, these results also reinforce recent research on voter decision-making. 
Primaries are typically low-information events, and consequently voters quite naturally 
rely heavily on cues and short-cuts in their decisions (Popkin 1 99 1 ). Our work meshes 
with this recent research , since reliance on priorities might be thought of as a reasonable 
means to cope with the information constraints and complexity of primary elections. The 
process we describe here also apply to other electoral contexts as well . Priorities have 
been shown to "matter" in presidential general election contests (RePass 1971 ) ,  and they 
might also matter in other races where the differences on major cleavage issues might be 
quite small and information about the positions of the candidates on such issues quite 
imperfect .  In elections such as these, it is very likely that voters are more concerned 
with choosing the candidate who will be best for the office based upon the priorities 
emphasized by the candidate. 
And last, our research analyzes institutional influences on voting. Our argument 
hinges on important institutional differences in presidential primary and general election 
contexts, and upon how these different electoral institutions influence voters decision­
making. Perhaps other important differences in electoral institutions - either in the 
Uni ted States or between nations - have understandable influences on voter decision­
making. By understanding such differences, we will be better equipped to model voter 
choices and electoral outcomes. 
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Table 1 :  Ideological Positions in the 1 988 Primaries 
Candidate Position Distance 
Democrats: 
Hart 2 .92 0.60 
Jackson 3.05 0.47 
Babbitt 3.53 0.01 
Dukakis 3 .66 0 . 14  
Simon 3.70 0 . 18 
Gephardt 3.78 0.26 
Gore 4 .03 0 .51 
Average 3.52 0.31 
Republicans: 
Dupont 4.66 0.39 
Kemp 4.97 0.08 
Dole 5.00 0.05 
Haig 5 .08 0.03 
Bush 5.23 0 . 18 
Robertson 5.35 0.30 
Average 5.05 0. 1 7
Note: Data taken from the 1988 NES Super Tuesday Study. The first column gives 
the mean placement of the candidate and the second column the absolute distance 
between the candidate and the average position of that party's candidates. 
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Table 2 :  Issue Mentions in the 1 988 Democratic Primary 
Issue Democrats Dukakis Gephardt Gore Jackson 
Central America 5 .8 12 .7 3 .8 3 .0 2 .0 
Defense 18 .4 9 .1  3 .8  72. 7 8.0 
Fiscal Affairs 5.3 10.9 3 .8 6 . 1  0 .0 
Poor 1 1 . 1  7.3 3 .8 9 . 1  24.0 
Social Security 2 . 1  1 .8 5 .8 0.0 0.0 
Trade 24.7 20.0 63.5 6 . 1  2 .0 
Unemployment 32.6 38.2 1 5.4 3.0 64.0 
Note: Entries are percentages o tot a can I ate mentions. The content analysis 
methodology is discussed in the text. 
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Table 3: Issue Mentions in  the 1988 Republican Primary 
Issue Republicans Bush Dole Kemp Robertson 
Central America 29.3 47. 1 33.3 6 . 1  10 . 2  
Defense 2 1 .6 12 .6 12.8 24.2 42.9 
Fiscal Affairs 14 .9 16. 1 20.5 27.3 0 .0  
Moral Values 1 0.6 4.6 7.7 6. 1 26.5 
Poor 5 .3 4 .6 12.8 6 . 1  0 . 0  
Social Security 6 .2 1 . 1  2.6 15 .2  12 .2  
Trade 7 .2 6 .9 7 .7 6. 1 8 .2 
Unemployment 4.8 6.9 2.6 9. 1 0 .0  
Note: Entries are percentages of tota can ate mentions. T e content analysis 
methodology is discussed in the text. 
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Table 4: Unordered Logit Model, Democratic Voters 
Independent [Pr(Gephardt vote)/ [Pr(Gore vote)/ [Pr( Jackson vote)/ 
Variables Pr(Dukakis vote) Pr(Dukakis vote) Pr(Dukakis vote) 
Constant - .02 .45* - .41 * 
( . 29) ( . 26) ( .30) 
Minority - . 15 - .54 ** 3 .3** 
( .23) ( . 2 1 )  ( . 15)  
Female - .08 - . 13 - .44** 
( . 1 1 )  ( . 09)  ( . 12) 
Union .36** - .03 . 1 7  
( . 13 )  ( . 12 )  ( . 14)  
Income - . 1 1  ** - . 14** - .05 
( .04) ( .04) ( .05) 
Unemployment - . 15  - . 1 9  . 09 
( . 14)  ( . 1 2) ( . 14 )  
Trade .84** . 36* - .44* 
( . 1 7) ( . 16) ( .25) 
Deficit - . 20 . 10 - .53** 
( . 14) ( . 1 1 )  ( . 16 )  
Social Security . 1 2  .25* - . 26* 
( . 13) ( . 1 1 )  ( . 1 5) 
Poor .02 - . 14 1 .0** 
( . 15 )  ( . 13) ( . 13) 
Defense - .21 . 1 3  - . 1 7  
( . 17) ( . 13 )  ( .20) 
Dukakis Rating -4.0** -3.8** -3.6** 
( . 19 )  ( . 18) ( . 20)  
Gephardt Rating 4 . 1 ** - . 04 - .01  
( .21 )  ( . 10 )  ( . 13)  
Gore Rating - .37** 4 .0** - .30** 
( . 12)  ( . 1 7) ( . 13 )  
Jackson Rating - .28** - .41  ** 3 .6** 
( . 12 )  ( . 10) ( . 19 )  
Reagan Approval .20* .40** - . 38** 
( . 12 )  ( . 10 )  ( . 15) 
Expectations. - .35* - .67** - 1 .5** 
( . 19 )  ( . 1 7) ( .25) 
Source: CBS News New York Times Super Tuesday Pnmary Elect10n Exi t Polls, 1 988. 
Entries are maximum-likelihood estimates, and their associated standard errors are 
in parentheses; * corresponds to a p=.05 level and **  corresponds to p=.01 level of 
statistical significance (one-tailed tests) . 
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Table 5: Priority Effects in Democratic Logit Model 
Model Constraint Log-likelihood x2 
No Issues -3904.59 627.62* 
Unemployment -3593.03 4 .5  
Trade -3609.45 37.34* 
Deficit -381 1 .0 1  440.46* 
Social Security -3596.58 1 1 .6* 
Poor -3630.6 79.64*
Defense -3593. 1 2  4.68 
The second column gives the log-likelihoods for models estimated with the respective 
coefficients in the model constrained to be zero. For the first row in the table, there 
were twelve restrictions, and for the other rows there were two restrictions (yielding 
12  and 2 degrees of freedom, respectively). * indicates statistical signifigance at the 
p=.05 level on the x2 test . 
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Table 6: Issue Priorities and Probabilities of Candidate Support 
[Pr( Gephardt vote) /Pr(Dukakis vote)] 
Issues Pr(Voter A)  � Pr(Voter B )  � Pr(Voter C)  � 
No Issues 52 - 40 - 33 -
Unemployment 48 -4 37 -3 30 -3 
Trade 71 19 61 21 54 21 
Deficit 47 -5 36 -4 29 -4 
Social Security 55 3 43 3 36 3 
Poor 52 0 41  1 34 1 
Defense 47 -5 35 -5 29 -4 
[Pr( Gore vote)/Pr(Dukakis vote)] 
Issues Pr(Voter A)  � Pr(Voter B )  � Pr(Voter C)  � 
No Issues 44 - 53 - 35 -
Unemployment 39 -5 49 -4 31 -4 
Trade 52 8 62 9 43 8 
Deficit 46 2 56 3 37 2 
Social Security 50 6 60 7 41  6 
Poor 40 -4 50 -3 32 -3 
Defense 47 3 57 4 38 3 
[Pr( Jackson vote)/Pr(Dukakis vote)] 
Issues Pr(Voter A)  � Pr(Voter B )  � Pr(Voter C) � 
No Issues 95 - 26 - 8 -
Unemployment 96 1 28 2 8 0 
Trade 93 -2 18 -8 5 -3 
Deficit 92 -3 17  -9 5 -3 
Social Security 94 -1 21 -7 6 -2 
Poor 98 3 49 23 18 10 
Defense 94 -1 23 -3 6 -2 . . . Source: Unordered log1 t model presented m Table 7. The probab1hties are simula­
tions based on three different voter profiles; see the text for d iscussion of the specific 
profiles employed in this table. The second column for each "voter" gives the dif­
ference between the estimated probability of candidate support relative to Dukakis 
support were the specific issue identified by the voter as important and the estimated 
probability of relative support were no issues important to the voter. 
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Table 7: Unordered Logit Model, Republican Voters 
Independent [Pr(Dole vote)/ [Pr(Kemp vote)/ [Pr(Robertson vote)/ 
Variables Pr(Bush vote) Pr(Bush vote) Pr(Bush vote) 
Constant -. 16  -1.3** - 1.2** 
(.24) (.34) (.35) 
M inority .03 .33 . 13 
(.21 )  (.30) (.30) 
Female . 19* -. 14  -.05 
(.09) (. 13) (. 13) 
Born-Again .48** . 75** 1.6** 
( . 12) ( . 16) ( . 14) 
Income .01 -.03 - .10* 
( .03) (.05) (.05) 
IRMT .04 -.25 -.29 
( . 14)  (.24) ( .25) 
Trade .42** .24 - .02 
( .14) (.23) ( .24) 
Deficit .40** .20 -.04 
( . 10) (. 15) (. 15) 
Nicaragua -. 1 7  . 1 1  .03 
(. 13) (. 18)  ( . 19) 
Social Security -.03 -.31 -.34* 
( . 12 )  (.2 1 )  (.20) 
Moral Values -.21 * .47** 1. 1 ** 
( . 12)  (. 16) (. 14) 
Taxes -.33** .33* -.68** 
(. 1 1 )  (. 15)  ( . 18) 
Bush Rating -3.9** -3.5** . -3 .8** 
( . 15) (. 18) ( . 18) 
Dole Rating 3.9** -.21  .09 
( . 1 7) ( . 13) ( . 14)  
Kemp Rating - .26** 3.0** -.47** 
(.09) ( . 22) ( . 14) 
Robertson Rating .01 -. 1 7  4.6** 
( . 1 1 )  ( .16) ( . 23) 
Reagan Approval -.65** -.05 - .34 
( . 14) (.22) ( .21 ) 
Expectations - .06 - 1.3** - 1.6** 
( . 15)  (.34) ( .34) 
Source: CBS News New York Times Super Tuesday Pnmary Election Exit Polls, 1 988. 
Entries are maximum-likelihood estimates, and their associated standard errors are 
in parentheses; * corresponds to a p= .05 level and ** corresponds to a p=.01 level of 
statistical significance (one-tailed tests). 
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Table 8 :  Priority Effects in  Republican Logit Model 
Model Constraint Log-likelihood x2 
No Issues -3527.44 326.76* 
IRMT -3365.42 2.  7
Trade -3369.08 10.04 * 
Deficit -3452.59 177.06* 
Nicaragua -3365.52 2 .9 
Social Security -3366.50 4 .9 
Moral Values -3408. 78 89.44* 
Taxes -3379.98 31.84* 
The second column gives t e og- i e i oo s or mo els estimated with the respective 
coefficients in the model constrained to be zero. For the first row in the table, there 
were fourteen restrictions, and for the other rows there were two restrictions (yielding 
14and 2 degrees of freedom, respectively) . * indicates statistical signifigance at the 
p= .05 level on the x2 test . 
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Table 9: Issue Priorities and Probabilities of Candidate Support 
[Pr(Dole vote)/Pr(Bush vote)] 
Issues Pr(Voter A) � Pr(Voter B )  � Pr(Voter C)  � 
No Issues 58 - 32 - 50 -
Irmt 59 1 33 1 51  1 
Trade 68 10  42 10  60 10  
Deficit 68 10  4 1  9 60 10 
Nicaragua 54 -4 28 -4 45 -5 
Social Security 57 - 1  31 -12 49 -1 
Moral Values 53 -5 28 -4 45 -5 
Taxes 50 -8 25 -7  42 -8 
[Pr(Kemp vote)/Pr(Bush vote)] 
Issues Pr(Voter A )  � Pr(Voter B)  � Pr(Voter C)  � 
No Issues 35 - 18 - 6 -
lrmt 30 -5 14 -4 4 -2 
Trade 41 6 21  3 7 1 
Deficit 40 5 21  3 7 1 
Nicaragua 37 2 19  1 6 0 
Social Security 28 -7 14  -4 4 -2 
Moral Values 46 1 1  25 7 9 3 
Taxes 43 8 23 5 8 2 
[Pr(Robertson vote)/Pr(Bush vote)] 
Issues Pr(Voter A) � Pr(Voter B)  � Pr(Voter C) � 
No Issues 56 - 1 1  - 4 -
lrmt 49 -7 9 -2 3 -1 
Trade 56 0 1 1  0 4 0 
Deficit 55 -1 1 1  0 4 0 
Nicaragua 57 1 12 1 5 1 
Social Security 48 -8 8 -3 3 -1 
Moral Values 80 24 28 17  12  8 
Taxes 39 - 17 6 -5 2 -2 
Source: Unordered logit model presented in Table 4. The probabilities are simulations 
based on three different voter profiles; see the text for discussion of the specific profiles 
employed in this table. The second column for each "voter" gives the difference 
between the estimated probability of candidate support relative to Bush support were 
the specific issue identified by the voter as important and the estimated probability 
of relative support were no issues important to the voter. 
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